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 Little research has investigated children’s perceptions of gender ambiguous 
individuals who are not part of a binary gender category. Five- to 8-year-olds were tested 
to determine whether appearance or conceptual information (i.e., occupation information, 
trait information) was prioritized when grouping a gender ambiguous target with other 
people. Children heard two stories with verbalized or no verbalized gender information. 
The target shared conceptual qualities with a character of stereotypical gender appearance 
(conceptual match) and appearance qualities with a character of gender ambiguous 
appearance (appearance match). Participants were asked which character the target 
should be friends with and which character’s novel activity preference the target shared. 
Results indicated that the inclusion of verbalized gender information did not 
systematically change children’s response patterns. However, older children prioritized 
trait information over appearance information, while younger children valued trait and 
appearance information equally. For the occupation story, children did not 
overwhelmingly prioritize occupation information, indicating that they might not regard 
occupation information as much as trait information when making predictions about 
gender ambiguous people. Implications include a better understanding of children’s 
beliefs about individuals who exist outside of strict social categories, which can inform 
ways to combat negativity and promote acceptance of people who deviate from group-
based expectations. 
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Gender is a salient social category that is often perceived as binary (i.e., boy/girl). 
Beginning early in childhood, gender cues are evident through dichotomous labels, 
appearances, and activities (Martin, Ruble, & Szkryablo, 2002; Shutts, 2013). Gender 
categories are inductive, as members of a gender group are often labeled similarly and 
assumed to look and act alike. In fact, preschoolers assume that a boy with girl-like 
features shares properties with other boys, regardless of appearance (e.g., Gelman, 
Collman, & Maccoby, 1986). Despite associations between gender categories and 
specific labels, appearances, and behaviors, people can deviate from category-based 
expectations. Someone perceived as gender ambiguous and who does not appear to 
belong to a gender category might cause confusion. Those who appear gender ambiguous 
lack appearance, label, or behavioral cues that subsume them to a specific gender 
category. Gender category-based assumptions are then compromised and possibly 
ineffective. Given the inductive power of gender, how might children reason about a 
perceptually gender ambiguous person? Perceptual gender ambiguity and its implications 
for how children reason about category-based deviations have yet to be investigated 
systematically. The current study examined whether appearance, or traits and 
preferences, guide children’s inferences about an individual who appears gender 
ambiguous. 
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Little research has explored perceptions of gender ambiguity, despite the 
existence of individuals in the real world who do not adhere to the binary gender 
categories and despite calls for investigations of individuals outside of strict social 
categories (Dunham & Olson, 2016). However, existent findings regarding gender-related 
beliefs and stereotyping provide a foundation for understanding children’s beliefs about 
gender ambiguity. Children develop gender stereotypes in preschool that peak at about 5 
years of age and reach flexibility by 9 years of age (e.g., Martin, Fabes, Evans, & 
Wyman, 1999; Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 1998; Trautner et al., 2005). These beliefs 
are evident when both gender category information and conceptual information about a 
person are provided, such as preferences for specific activities. For example, 5-year-olds 
endorsed the stereotype that dolls are for girls, regardless of a girl’s personal preferences 
(Martin, 1989). Nine-year-olds instead believed that girls do not need to like dolls. 
Rather, these children reported that a girl can engage in other behaviors that are similar to 
her preferences and stereotypical of boys. By 9 years of age, children do not prioritize 
gender category over a person’s personal preferences and, instead, both types of 
information are regarded (Martin, 1989). Similarly, when provided with gender-based 
information (i.e., labeled as and appears gender ambiguous) and conceptual information 
about a perceptually gender ambiguous individual, children’s beliefs about the individual 
might shift with age.  
When reasoning about a gender ambiguous person, labels and appearance might 
provide sources of information. Labels and appearance cues might lead children to reason 
about gender ambiguity as they do for the binary gender groups: individuals labeled as 
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and that look gender ambiguous must hold similar preferences as and be grouped with 
other gender ambiguous people. Younger children (e.g., 5- to 6-year-olds) lack flexibility 
when gender expectations are defied and might infer that a gender ambiguous individual 
should be grouped with others who are labeled and appear gender ambiguous. Conceptual 
information in the form of traits or preferences for activities provide another source of 
reference: individuals labeled as and that look gender ambiguous, but are shy, should 
hold similar preferences as and be grouped with other shy people. Because older children 
(e.g., 7- to 8-year-olds) exhibit greater flexibility in their gender stereotype beliefs, they 
might infer that a perceptually gender ambiguous person should be grouped with others 
who hold similar conceptual qualities. 
The current study investigated children’s reasoning about gender ambiguity. 
Specifically, the study examined whether 5- to 8-year-olds prioritize appearance or 
conceptual information when asked to group a perceptually gender ambiguous person 
with perceptually gender ambiguous others or gender stereotypical others. This extends 
findings from previous research designed to compare appearance to conceptual 
information (e.g., Heyman & Gelman, 2000), as past studies were not done with explicit 
consideration of appearance ambiguity. I will begin by reviewing literature that 
demonstrates the inductive power of gender categories, including differences that arise 
through labeling and appearance manipulations. I will then review past research that 
compares category and appearance information to conceptual information when 
predictions are made about an individual. Lastly, the current study will be described in 
detail. 
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Gender Category Biases: The Role of Labeling and Appearance 
Children use gender categories to determine how much they like someone, what 
activities that person engages in, and other characteristics about the individual (Ruble et 
al., 1998). Labels for specific items (e.g., “This toy is for boys.”) and appearance 
manipulations that demonstrate lack of adherence to gender stereotypes (e.g., a boy 
wearing a dress) reflect children’s tendency to use gender as a basis for making 
inferences about another person. Investigations of whether gender ambiguity impacts the 
use of gender category based beliefs to make predictions about another person are scant, 
but existent findings provide a basis for exploration. 
Labeling. Children show gender biases when objects are labeled for a gender 
category. When 4- to 9-year-olds were presented with gender neutral objects labeled for 
boys, girls, or both, they explored objects labeled for their own gender category more 
often and had better memory for those objects (Bradbard, Martin, Endsley, & Halverson, 
1986). Labeling also dictates children’s inferences about others. Four- and 5-year-olds 
preferred novel toys labeled for their own gender group and extended this gender-based 
preference to others (Martin, Eisenbud, & Rose, 1995). Labeling individuals to a gender 
group induces similar biases (Shutts, Roben, & Spelke, 2013). 
Labeling relates to children’s reasoning about perceptually gender ambiguous 
people because ambiguity might be unfamiliar. Without a gender ambiguous label, 5- and 
6-year-olds might automatically categorize a gender ambiguous person as a boy or girl, 
grouping them with others who have a stereotypical boy or girl appearance. Such 
grouping might be most evident if similarities (e.g., traits or preferences) are provided 
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between the individual and someone of gender stereotypical appearance. However, 
labeling someone as gender ambiguous might lead 5- and 6-year-olds to predict that the 
person should be grouped with others who look gender ambiguous, given their reliance 
on gender labeling as a basis for inference (Martin et al., 1995). Seven- and 8-year-olds 
might look for grouping cues above and beyond labeling (Martin, 1989), resulting in a 
reduced tendency to group based on ambiguous appearance and label.  
Appearance. Deviations from gender appearance expectations reveal gender 
biases, as children are aware of gendered features in hairstyle, clothing, and other 
physical markers (e.g., Halim et al., 2014). For example, when shown a boy with counter-
stereotypical appearance features (e.g., long hair), 3- to 11-year-olds regarded the boy 
negatively (Blakemore, 2003). Violations against gender-based expectations in other 
domains (e.g., preferences) are not regarded as negatively: a boy with long hair received 
harsher judgment than a boy who liked to play with tea sets (Blakemore, 2003). Still, the 
negativity regarding appearance violations does not indicate the absence of gender 
category-based inferences about others. A boy with long hair might receive negative 
judgment, but that does not equate to the prediction that he should not behave similarly 
to, prefer the same activities as, or be grouped with other boys. Similarly, a perceptually 
gender ambiguous individual might receive negative judgment, but it is unclear what 
predictions would be made about the individual’s behavior, preferences, and grouping. 
Gender ambiguity is different from stereotypical appearance deviations because it 
denotes a lack of belonging to a dichotomous gender group, rather than holding features 
of the opposite gender group. Because gender ambiguity deviates from expectation, 
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negative judgments about gender ambiguity may be exhibited across childhood. Still, 
gender categories are inductive by 4 years of age, regardless of appearance deviations 
(Gelman et al., 1986). Four-year-olds who were shown a drawing of a child with a 
counter-stereotypical appearance and a gender label used the labeled gender category as a 
basis for prediction: a boy with long hair would like to play with trucks, rather than dolls 
(Gelman et al., 1986). Relatedly, children often believe that people of the same gender 
category share internal characteristics that link them together, also known as gender 
essentialism (e.g., Gelman & Taylor, 2000). Four- to 6-year-olds typically support gender 
essentialist endorsements, but depart from those beliefs by 9 to 10 years of age (Taylor, 
Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009). In parallel, the privilege granted to gender categories over 
other forms of information might also decline in middle childhood.  
A gender ambiguous individual might be linked to other gender ambiguous 
individuals or be categorized to a dichotomous and inductive gender category. When 
labeled, the individual might be assumed to behave similarly to, prefer the same activities 
as, or be grouped with other gender ambiguous people. Without a label, the individual 
might be categorized into an existent gender category and assumed to behave similarly to, 
prefer the same activities as, or be grouped with other members of that gender group. 
Both tendencies may be typical in 5- to 6-year-olds, who often endorse gender essentialist 
beliefs and group-based thinking. Seven- and 8-year-olds, who depart from gender 
essentialism endorsements and regard gender more flexibly, may look outside of 
appearance and gender categories to base their predictions about perceptually gender 
ambiguous people, regardless of labeling. This brings to question what other 
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characteristics can be used to make predictions about perceptually gender ambiguous 
individuals.  
What Matters Outside of Gender Category and Appearance?  
 People hold characteristics beyond appearance and gender, such as traits and 
preferences. Traits can be used to make predictions about others (Heyman & Gelman, 
2000). Likewise, activity preferences provide insight about someone’s engagement in 
specific past times, occupations, or behaviors. If children prioritize conceptual 
information (i.e., traits, activity preferences) over gender, they might use it to make 
inferences about a person’s other behaviors, preferences, and grouping. Previous studies 
compared conceptual information to gender category labels and appearances 
(Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006; Heyman & Gelman, 2000) and inform current knowledge 
about the interplay between gender ambiguity and conceptual information.  
In the developmental literature, a key paradigm that compares conceptual 
information to gender labels and appearances involves two characters that share different 
characteristics with a third, target character. For example, in one study, children were told 
about 1) a target, such as a girl who is shy, 2) a character that shares gender category 
information with the target, such as a girl who is outgoing and likes to play zigo, and 3) a 
character that shares trait information with the target, such as a boy who is shy and likes 
to play zaber (Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006). When 5- and 6-year-olds were asked if the 
target liked to play the same novel activity as the gender or trait match (e.g, “Do you 
think she likes to play zaber like him, or zigo like her?”), traits were prioritized as often 
as gender (Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006). Still, collapsed across social categories, 
 8 
children prioritize social categories over trait information generally (Diesendruck & 
haLevi, 2006). When all trio members belong to the same gender category, this paradigm 
can be used to compare appearance with trait information.  
Results from this paradigm reflect children’s use of trait over appearance 
information to guide their inferences about others by preschool age (e.g., Heyman & 
Gelman, 2000). This is in line with previous demonstrations that children use traits to 
predict behaviors (e.g., Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 2007). Three- to 4-year-olds were 
introduced to a trio: trait information was shared between the target and one character, 
and appearance markers (e.g., style of hair) were shared between the target and the 
remaining character (Heyman & Gelman, 2000). Across age groups, children inferred 
that the target preferred to play the same novel activity as the trait match over the 
appearance match (Heyman & Gelman, 2000).  
Conceptual information can also include activity preferences, which might 
interplay differently with gender category and appearance information. Activity 
information may be susceptible to gender-based biases, as children are aware of 
stereotypes pertaining to toys and occupations (Liben & Bigler, 2002). Children assumed 
that a boy who wanted to be an auto mechanic also engaged in other masculine activities 
and should be grouped with boys (Liben & Bigler, 2002). It is uncertain whether the 
activity and its gendered associations, or gender category, guided children’s reasoning, as 
the trio paradigm has not been used to compare activities to gender information. To 
determine whether children prioritize activities or gender information when reasoning 
about others’ behaviors, preferences, and groupings, gender neutral activities can be 
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incorporated into the trio paradigm. A target might prefer the same neutral activity as one 
character and share gender information with another character, allowing the influence of 
gender category and activity information to be teased apart. 
Some comparisons demonstrate developmental changes in the privilege attributed 
to gender over activity information. When provided with gender category and conceptual 
information in the form of gender stereotypical, counter-stereotypical, or neutral toy 
interests, 3- to 5-year-olds prioritized gender category labels over conceptual information 
for making preference predictions about others (Martin, 1989).  Predictions were based 
on a girl labeled as a girl, rather than her preference for playing with trucks (Martin, 
1989). By contrast, 6- to 10-year-olds integrated category labels and conceptual 
information when making predictions about others. Compared to trait information, 
activity information interacts with gender information differently to form children’s 
predictions about a person’s interests, behaviors, and groupings. 
Traits may be used more than activities to guide inferences about others. Traits 
are at least comparable to gender category as a basis for reasoning (e.g., Diesendruck & 
haLevi, 2006) and involve features that might inform behavioral predictions more than 
activity preferences. Activities are often disregarded by younger children when given in 
conjunction with category information (e.g., Martin, 1989). Comparisons of gender and 
appearances to traits and activities separately exist, but the role of gender ambiguity in 
those relationships has not been considered. A lack of gender category elicits the need to 
move beyond gender category based beliefs.  
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The trio paradigm can be adapted to determine whether conceptual information or 
labeled ambiguity and appearance serve as a basis for predicting how a perceptually 
gender ambiguous person should be grouped. A perceptually gender ambiguous target 
can share appearance information with one character (i.e., gender ambiguous) and 
conceptual information (i.e., traits, activities) with another character. Different types of 
conceptual information (traits, activities) must also be considered to determine if they 
hold similar influence over grouping. Further, the trio paradigm can be expanded by 
manipulating the explicit labeling of gender ambiguity. This allows the role of labeling 
on children’s reasoning about perceptual gender ambiguity to be investigated, as a 
perceptually gender ambiguous person might be automatically categorized into an 
existing gender category or children may generally lack familiarity with gender 
ambiguity. Shifts across development in children’s responses patterns can also be 
examined, given a more flexible understanding of gender stereotypes and less reliance on 
gender category information with age. Age differences can elucidate how response 
patterns may change in parallel with other developmental changes, such as those related 
to gender essentialism and theory of mind, or the knowledge of others’ mental states 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004).  
Children’s dependence on gender categories as a source of reasoning and their 
rigidity about gender stereotypes declines with age, which coincides with improvements 
in theory of mind (Mulvey, Rizzo, & Killen, 2016). By the end of preschool, children 
typically demonstrate false-belief theory of mind, which means they can acknowledge 
others’ mental states (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Interpretive theory of mind is the ability to 
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acknowledge that individuals can form distinct interpretations from the same experience 
and develops by 7 to 8 years of age (Ross, Recchia, & Carpendale, 2005). Relatedly, 6- to 
9-year-olds demonstrate an overinterpretive theory of mind bias that focuses on person-
specific explanations that deny the relevance of previous, common experiences between 
people (Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Blattman, 2010). This is particularly strong for 6- to 7-year-
olds and less so in 8- to 9-year-olds (Lagattuta et al., 2010). Relatedly, children with an 
overinterpretive theory of mind may use conceptual information to group a perceptually 
gender ambiguous person. Those without an overinterpretive theory of mind may use 
appearance and category information to guide their grouping decisions about the target, 
as they may be less focused on individual-specific, conceptual information. 
The Current Study 
For the current study, 5- to 8-year-olds were asked to group a perceptually gender 
ambiguous target with another perceptually gender ambiguous person or a stereotypical 
person that holds conceptual similarities with the target. Using the trio paradigm (e.g., 
Heyman & Gelman, 2000), the target and a gender stereotypical character shared 
conceptual information (e.g., trait or occupation preference), while the target and a 
gender ambiguous character shared appearance information (e.g., both do not look to 
belong to a gender category). To investigate potential contributors to grouping decisions 
about the target, the explicit labeling of gender ambiguity was manipulated and 
participants were exposed to multiple forms of conceptual information (i.e., trait, 
occupation). A baseline condition, in which all similarities were shared between the 
target and gender ambiguous character, was also used. If children matched the target and 
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gender ambiguous character, it would suggest that children understand that conceptual 
similarities serve as a basis for matching, even more so if supplemented with appearance 
similarities. Any matching between the target and the gender stereotypical character 
would not be based on conceptual or appearance similarities. The latter type of matching 
would suggest a bias for choosing the gender stereotypical character and interferes with 
interpretations of whether children rely on conceptual or appearance information when 
grouping the target. 
To determine grouping decisions, children were asked to infer who the target 
should be friends with (Friendship Question) and what novel activities the target 
preferred (Novel Activities Question). Both questions were used to determine if 
inferences about novel activities elicit similar responses as questions about friendship. 
Friendship is particularly relevant to gender: preschool aged children infer more same-
gender category friendships between two individuals than cross-gender friendships and 
exhibit same-gender friendship preferences (e.g., Martin et al., 1999). By contrast, the 
Novel Activities Question involves inferences about novel properties that lack 
associations to any particular trait, occupation, or gender group. This allows for 
children’s grouping decisions to indicate the influence of the information given in the 
present study, rather than the influence of external sources (e.g., Heyman & Gelman, 
2000).  
Grouping decisions were also investigated in relation to parallel changes in 
gender essentialism beliefs and theory of mind. Gender essentialism is the notion that 
members of a gender category share intrinsic characteristics that link them together 
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(Gelman & Taylor, 2000). Children who endorse gender essentialist beliefs prioritize 
gender labels and category over appearance (Gelman et al., 1986), which indicates a 
potential connection to gender ambiguity. A scale of gender essentialism was adapted 
from Rhodes and Gelman (2009) to determine possible connections to grouping 
decisions. Grouping decisions might have also related to an overinterpretive theory of 
mind bias, as mentioned earlier. The Droodles task was administered to assess whether an 
overinterpretive theory of mind related to children’s grouping decisions about a 
perceptually gender ambiguous person (Lagatutta et al., 2010).  
Regardless of whether ambiguity was verbally denoted and labeled, children may 
have automatically categorized the target into a binary category. For this reason, children 
were also administered an Ambiguity Check at the end of the study to determine whether 
they maintained the target as gender ambiguous (labeled condition) and did not 
exclusively perceive the target as belonging to a binary gender category (unlabeled 
condition).  
Predictions were as follows: An interaction between labeling and age was 
expected for the Novel Activities Question and the Friendship Question. For both 
questions, 5- and 6-year-olds were expected to make more conceptual matches in the 
unlabeled condition compared to the labeled condition, as labeling elicits category-based 
thinking for younger children (e.g., Martin et al., 1995). Seven- and 8-year-olds were 
predicted to look beyond appearance and behave more consistently across the labeled and 
unlabeled conditions. A main effect of story information type was also expected for each 
question: children were expected to make fewer conceptual matches if exposed to 
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occupation, rather than trait, information. As early as 3 years of age, trait-based 
inferences occur despite appearance similarities (Heyman & Gelman, 2000). Given that 
3-year-olds show trait-based matching, and preschoolers prioritize gender category over 
activity information (Martin, 1989), story information type was expected to interact with 
age group for each question. Five- and 6-year-olds were expected to make more 
conceptual matches for the trait story compared to the occupation story. Seven- and 8-
year-olds were expected to make conceptual matches across both stories, given their 
ability look beyond gender information and integrate conceptual information (Martin, 
1989). Age was also expected to interact with question type: compared to the novel 
activities question, the friendship question was expected to elicit gender-based attitudes 
and therefore elicit appearance-based matches, particularly for 5- and 6-year-olds. This 
was not expected for 7- and 8-year-olds, who may have reached flexibility in their 
gender-based attitudes and beliefs. 
Further, high gender essentialism endorsements were expected to positively 
correlate with more appearance matches in the labeled condition, given the gender 
ambiguity label attributed to the target and gender ambiguous character. Lastly, children 
with an overinterpretive theory of mind were expected to make more conceptual matches 





One hundred six children were recruited from preschools and after-school 
programs in the Mid-Atlantic, along with recruitment from an existing database of 
families interested in contributing to developmental research. A power analysis for a 
three-way interaction with a mixed design was conducted with G*power using a medium 
effect size of .25, an alpha of .05, and 80% power. The analysis revealed the need for a 
total sample size of 104 children, divided into groups of 26 for each age. Two extra 
children (one 5-year-old and one 8-year-old) were also tested. A sample of 49 children 
was recruited to complete the baseline condition. 
Materials 
For the main task, photographs were used to depict two separate trios of six 
people (see Appendix C). Every trio included a photo of a White, gender stereotypical 
man or woman and photos of two White, perceptually gender ambiguous people. Each 
trio was presented separately on a sheet of white, laminated paper.  
Materials for the Essentialism Measure included a response scale (see Appendix 
F). A single sheet of laminated paper with a visual 5-point Likert scale of various sized 
circles was used to assess children’s responses.
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For the Droodles task, four different line drawings were used (a pig, a boot, a 
boat, flowers) with a corresponding occluder for each trial type. Three figures 
corresponding to the participants’ gender and two block houses were also used (Lagattuta 
et al. 2010). See Appendix G. 
A portable video camera and tripod were used to record each participant’s 
session. 
Design 
A 2 (age group: 5.0-6.9 vs. 7.0-8.9) x 2 (labeled condition: labeled or unlabeled) x 
2 (story information type: trait or occupation) mixed design was used, with condition and 
age group as between-subject variables and story information type as the within-subject 
variable. Participants in the labeled condition were given one vignette with trait 
information and another with occupation information. Vignettes for the unlabeled 
condition had all gender information replaced with non-gender information. Each 
vignette had the gender stereotypical character matched to the participant’s gender. The 
order of vignette presentation was counterbalanced.  
For the baseline condition, a 2 (age group: 5.0-6.9 vs. 7.0-8.9) x 2 (story 
information type: trait or occupation) design was used, with story information type and 
age group as between-subject variables. Participants heard a single vignette with either 
trait or occupation information, counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure 
Main task. To begin, informed consent was obtained from parents and assent 
from the child. Upon beginning the study, participants were told the following: “Today, 
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I’m going to tell you about some people. Then, I’ll ask you some questions about these 
people, but there are no right or wrong answers to the questions. Are you ready to get 
started?” Then, the first trio was placed directly in front of the participant and the first 
vignette was read aloud by the researcher. 
Given that the stereotypical characters in the vignettes were gender matched to the 
participant, the following examples provide a description for a girl participant. All 
dependent measures following the vignette presentations were given identically to all 
participants, regardless of gender matching.  
For the labeled condition, a girl participant given the occupation vignette first was 
told the following: “This person [point to the gender stereotypical character] is a girl. She 
looks like a girl. She wants to be a cook. She likes to play tibbits. We’re not sure about 
this person [point to the gender ambiguous character]. This person doesn’t look like a boy 
or a girl. This person wants to be an artist. This person likes to play jimjam. We’re not 
sure about this person either [point to the gender ambiguous target]. This person doesn’t 
look like a boy or a girl, like this person [point to the gender ambiguous character]. Also, 
this person wants to be a cook like her [point to the gender stereotypical character].” The 
occupations of cook and artist were chosen because both have been judged as gender 
neutral by children (Liben & Bigler, 2002), therefore lacking any gender-based 
associations that may interfere or supplement the gender information explicitly said 
within the vignette (i.e., is a girl, looks like a girl).  
The girl participant then heard a second vignette with trait information: “This 
person [point to the gender stereotypical character] is a girl. She looks like a girl. She is 
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shy.  She likes to spend time at villing. We’re not sure about this person [point to the 
gender ambiguous character]. This person doesn’t look like a boy or a girl. This person is 
creative. This person likes to spend time at kranoot. We’re not sure about this person 
either [point to the gender ambiguous target]. This person doesn’t look like a boy or a 
girl, like this person [point to the gender ambiguous character]. Also, this person is shy, 
like her [point to the gender stereotypical character].”  
The novel activities listed within each vignette were the following pairs: play 
tibbits/jimjam, spend time at villing/kranoot. Pairs were randomly chosen to accompany 
the first vignette, with the remaining pair assigned to the second vignette. The pairing of 
each novel activity with a specific trait or occupation was also randomized.  
In the unlabeled condition, all gender information (i.e., “This person is a girl. She 
looks like a girl.”) was replaced with non-gender information (i.e., “This person is short. 
This person wears small clothes.”). This provided identical stories for boys and girls, 
regardless of gender matching between the stereotypical character and participant gender. 
To match the physical uncertainty posed by gender ambiguity in the labeled condition, 
participants were told the following for the target and gender ambiguous character: 
“We’re not sure if this person is tall or short. We’re not sure if they wear big or small 
clothes.”   
The following dependent measures were given to all participants in the same 
manner, as gender matching was only relevant to the information provided within the 
vignettes in the labeled condition. First, participants answered forced choice memory 
check questions about each character in randomized order to ensure comprehension of the 
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vignette (e.g., “Did I say this person was a boy, girl, or we’re not sure?”, “Did I say this 
person looks like a boy, girl, or we’re not sure?”, “Did I say this person wants to be a 
cook or an artist?”, and “Did I say this person likes to play tibbits or jimjam?”). The 
ordering of the novel activity information, occupation information, and trait information 
for each memory question was randomized (e.g., whether cook or artist was listed first). 
The memory question that involved novel activities was not given for the target character. 
Participants who failed any of the memory check questions after more than three 
repetitions of the information within each question were excluded from analyses, as their 
comprehension of the vignette was insufficient. See Appendix D. 
Following the memory check, participants were asked a Novel Activities 
Question and Friendship Question as the two main dependent measures. For these 
questions, participants were asked to infer whether the target engages in the same novel 
activities as the conceptual or appearance match (e.g., Novel Activities Question: “Does 
this person [point to target] like to play tibbits like this person who is shy [point to gender 
stereotypical character] or does this person like to jimjam like this person who is creative 
[point to gender ambiguous character]?”). The ordering of the information within the 
Novel Activities Question was randomized (e.g., whether the conceptual or appearance 
match information was presented first for the question). Participants were also asked who 
the target should be friends with (i.e., Friendship Question: “Who should this person 
[point to target] be friends with?”) to determine by which dimension (appearance or 
conceptual match) children categorize the target (e.g., who the target is grouped with). 
The use of the word “should” was based from a meta-analysis by Signorella, Bigler, and 
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Liben (1993), which found that gender-related attitudes about individuals are best 
assessed with “can” or “should.” A follow-up justification question (i.e., “Why?”) was 
asked after the Novel Activities Question and the Friendship Question, but purely for 
exploratory purposes. The ordering of the Novel Activities Question and Friendship 
Question was counterbalanced across conditions. See Appendix E. 
Baseline condition. For the baseline condition, all details remained the same as 
the main task, except that the target and ambiguous character were matched on 
appearance and each form of conceptual information. Children were asked to first answer 
the Novel Activities Question and then the Friendship Question. This was done because 
the focus of the task was to determine if children grasped that common conceptual 
information should serve as a basis for an activity inference, especially when combined 
with common appearance information. The Friendship Question involved inferring the 
target’s friendship preferences and may have encompassed more of the participant’s 
social judgments than the Novel Activities Question. The latter question was designed to 
be based solely on the information provided within the story. See Appendix E. 
 Secondary tasks.  
Target character activity inferences. Participants were asked whether they 
believed that the target engages in a variety of gender stereotypical or neutral behaviors 
across ten questions. The listed activities were adapted from previous studies that 
investigated gender stereotypes (e.g., Boseovski, Hughes, & Miller, 2016; Liben & 
Bigler, 2002).  
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For example, children were asked: “Does this person like to play with dolls, toy 
trucks, or both?” The inclusion of “both” allowed for a better understanding of children’s 
decisions, as a forced choice question (e.g., “Does this person like to play with dolls or 
toy trucks?”) would not grant children as much flexibility in their responses and may 
have inflated results. Each question included a 1) girl stereotypical activity, boy 
stereotypical activity, 2) girl stereotypical activity, neutral activity, or 3) boy stereotypical 
activity, neutral activity. See Appendix E. 
Character liking, affiliation, and trait attribution. For each character, 
participants were asked a question to assess personal liking (e.g., “How much do you like 
this person - a lot, a little, or in the middle?”) and a question to measure desire for 
affiliation (e.g., “How much would you like to be friends with this person - a lot, a little, 
or in the middle?”). Then, they were asked a trait attribution (i.e., “Do you think this 
person is nice, mean, or not nice or mean?”) question (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). 
Character order was randomized. See Appendix E.  
Essentialism measure (adapted from Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). Participants 
were asked four questions regarding gender essentialism (e.g., “Knowing if a kid is a girl 
or a boy tells you a lot about the kid."). Responses to each question were answered using 
a visual 5-point scale, using various sized circles to demonstrate agreement (i.e., smallest 
circle = I really disagree, next smallest = I disagree, medium sized = I don’t agree or 
disagree, big = I agree, largest = I really agree). Participants were trained prior to 
answering the questions. For the full list of questions, the visual scale, and training 
details, see Appendix F. 
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Droodles task (Lagattuta et al., 2010). To begin this task, participants were 
introduced to two characters (Sam and Alex) matched to the participant’s gender. Two 
block houses were also introduced, and participants were asked to assign a house to each 
character. A sign with the character’s name and picture was then placed on the 
character’s house. From there, participants were told that when the characters are in their 
homes, “they can’t hear what we are saying or see what we are doing.” Then, participants 
completed three different trial types that were randomized in their presentation: 
irrelevant-past, relevant-past, and distinct-pasts. For each trial type, either Sam or Alex 
were taken out of their house and shown a single line drawing. Thus, for each trial, either 
Sam or Alex was knowledgeable about the drawing’s contents. The other character was 
naïve about the drawing’s contents.  
After a single character viewed a drawing, they were placed back into their house. 
Then, the experimenter would place an occluder over the drawing. In the irrelevant-past 
trial, the visible portion of the drawing allowed for a naïve observer to distinguish what 
the photo was (e.g., for the flower photo, the occluder window allowed one to see the 
flowers). For the relevant-past trial, the occulder was placed over an ambiguous portion 
of the drawing that did not allow a naïve observer to distinguish what the photo depicted 
(e.g., the curve of a boat for the boat picture). For the distinct-pasts trial, each character 
saw a different picture (e.g., pig or boot) that appeared similar with the occluder. The 
occluder was then placed over one of the drawings.  
For each drawing, participants were reminded that each character either saw or 
did not see the picture and were asked what each character would think the drawing was 
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while the occluder was over it (e.g., “Sam has never seen this picture before, what will 
Sam think this is?”). Then, a naïve third character was introduced (e.g., “Jo did not see or 
hear what we were doing. Jo has never seen this picture before.”) and participants were 
asked to infer what (s)he would believe the drawing was (“What will Jo think this is?”). 
This same procedure was repeated for all trials. See Appendix G. 
Ambiguity check. Children were asked whether they believed the target from each 
vignette belonged to a specific gender category (i.e., “Do you think this person [point to 
target] is a boy, a girl, or you’re not sure?”). They were also asked whether they believed 
each target’s appearance resembled a boy, girl, or neither (i.e., “Do you think this person 
[point to target] looks like a boy, a girl, or you’re not sure?”), and about the target’s 
friendship decisions (i.e., “Is this person friends with boys, girls, or both?”). The two 
targets were presented in randomized order. The ordering of each question and the order 
of gender presentation for each question (e.g., whether boy or girl was listed first for each 




Data from two children (one 5-year-old and one 7-year-old) were excluded 
because they failed to pass the memory check questions. Data from three children (two 6-
year-olds and one 7-year-old) were excluded due to experimenter error. Also, because the 
Droodles Task was added to the protocol after testing began, only 89 children completed 
the task. First, I will discuss results from the baseline condition, followed by descriptive 
statistics and the main analyses.  
Baseline Condition 
All conceptual matches between the target and ambiguous character, who shared 
appearance and conceptual features with the target, were scored as 1. Matches between 
the target and the stereotypical character were scored as 0. Since each child received only 
one story in the baseline condition, scores ranged from 0 to 1. To investigate that children 
did not demonstrate a systematic bias for choosing the stereotypical character, results will 
be first reported when collapsed by age and story information type for the Novel 
Activities Question and the Friendship Question. Then, results will be reported for each 
story information type, given that occupation information has not been used with this 
paradigm in previous research.  
To grasp how children generally performed, regardless of age or story information 
type, both factors were collapsed. Children made more conceptual matches than expected 
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by chance for the Novel Activities Question (M = .90, SD = .31) and Friendship Question 
(M = .86, SD = .35), ps < .001. This was retained when analyzing responses for the Novel 
Activities Question within the occupation (M = .79, SD = .41) and trait stories (all 
children made conceptual matches), along with the Friendship Question within the 
occupation (M = .92, SD = .28) and trait (M = .80, SD = .41) stories, ps < .002. See Table 
1 for matching patterns by age group.  
Main Analyses 
For the Novel Activities Question and the Friendship Question, participants 
received a score of 0 for an appearance match and 1 for a conceptual match. This created 
a range from 0 to 1.  Children’s justifications for their answers (i.e., “Why?”) were coded 
in the following way: 0 = I don’t know/irrelevant, 1 = memory errors, 2 = appearance, 3 
= conceptual. 
Descriptive statistics. First, it was necessary to demonstrate that children 
consistently perceived the target as ambiguous in the labeled condition and did not 
exclusively categorize the target to a specific gender category (boy, girl) in the unlabeled 
condition. Therefore, frequencies were computed for each ambiguity check question. See 
Table 2 and Table 3. Compared to the unlabeled condition, those in the labeled condition 
more often reported uncertainty about the target’s gender category and whether the target 
appeared like a boy, girl, or whether they were unsure. Also compared to the unlabeled 
condition, children in the labeled condition reported that the target affiliated with both 
boys and girls more frequently. When broken down by story information type, the target 
was not exclusively categorized to a specific gender category, was not said to appear like 
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a member of a specific gender category, and was assumed to affiliate with both boys and 
girls. The highest percentage of specific gender categorization was for the occupation 
story, as 51.9% of children rated the target as a boy.  
To determine children’s general matching patterns, factors (labeling condition, 
story information type, and age group) were collapsed. Thus, matching scores for each 
question were summed across stories, resulting in Total Novel Activity Matching and  
Total Friendship Matching scores, each ranging from 0 to 2. Children made more 
conceptual matches (M = 1.19, SD = .73) than expected by chance for the Novel 
Activities Questions, t(105) = 2.66, p = .01, such that 81.1% of children made at least one 
conceptual match for the Novel Activities Question. Children also made more conceptual 
matches (M = 1.27, SD = .75) than expected by chance for the Friendship Question, 
t(105) = 3.76, p < .001, such that 82.1% of children made at least one conceptual match 
for the Friendship Question. By age group, younger (M = 1.09, SD = .77) and older (M 
=1.28, SD = .69) children did not differ significantly in conceptual matches made for the 
Novel Activities Question, t(104) = -1.33, p = .19. Younger children’s conceptual 
matches did not differ from chance, t(52) = .90, p =.37, but older children made more 
conceptual matches than expected by chance, t(52) = 2.99, p = .004. Differences failed to 
emerge between younger (M = 1.21, SD = .77) and older (M = 1.340, SD = .73) children 
for the Friendship Question as well, t(104) = -.91, p = .37. Younger children’s conceptual 
matches did not differ from chance, t(52) = 1.97, p = .06, but older children made more 
conceptual matches than expected by chance, t(52) = 3.38, p = .001. See Tables 4 and 5 
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for descriptive statistics for each age group by story information type for the labeled and 
unlabeled conditions, respectively.  
Novel activities question. A 2 (age group: 5- and 6-year-olds vs. 7- and 8-year-
olds) x 2 (labeling condition: labeled vs. unlabeled) x 2 (story information type: trait vs. 
occupation) binary repeated measures logistic regression analysis was completed for the 
Novel Activities Question using the GENMOD procedure on SAS. There was a 
significant story information type x age group interaction, β = 0.62, SE =0.30, p = .04; 
see Figure 1. The risk ratio obtained from the model revealed that older children were 
1.85 times more likely than younger children to make a conceptual match for the trait 
story. Overall, children performed at chance for the trait story (M = .59, SD = .50), t(105) 
= 1.77, p = .08. However, there was a significant difference in conceptual matches made 
in the trait story by older children (M = .70, SD = .46) and younger children (M = .47, SD 
= .50), χ(1, N = 106) = 5.60, p = .02. Younger children performed at chance for the trait 
story, t(52) = -.41, p = .68, but older children made more conceptual matches than  
expected by chance, t(52) = 3.11, p = .003. Overall, for the occupation story, children 
made more conceptual matches than expected by chance (M = .60, SD = .49), t(105) = 
2.17, p = .03. Conceptual matches made by younger (M = .62, SD = .49) and older 
children (M = .59, SD = .50) did not differ significantly, χ(1, N = 106) = .16, p = .69. 
Unlike the trait story, both age groups performed at chance for the occupation story (ps > 
.05).  
No other effects emerged as significant: there was no effect of labeling, β = -0.22, 
SE = 0.22, p = 0.31, and labeling did not systematically impact conceptual matching 
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between age groups, β = 0.06, SE = 0.32, p = 0.84. There was also no effect of age group, 
χ(1, N = 106) = .16, p = .69, or story information type, β = -0.41, SE = 0.24, p = 0.09.   
For the trait story, 59.4% of children’s justifications were irrelevant, 21.7% were 
trait based, 9.4% are appearance based, and 9.4% suggested memory errors. Cohen’s 
Kappa was .90. For the occupation story, 60.4% of children’s justifications were 
irrelevant, 22.6% were occupation based, 9.4% suggested memory errors, and 7.5% were 
appearance based. Cohen’s Kappa was .81. 
Friendship question. A 2 (age group: 5- and 6-year-olds vs. 7- and 8-year-olds) x 
2 (labeling condition: labeled vs. unlabeled) x 2 (story information type: trait vs. 
occupation) binary repeated measures logistic regression analysis was completed for the 
Friendship Question using the GENMOD procedure on SAS. No effects emerged as 
significant (ps > .05). Children’s conceptual matches did not systemically differ between 
labeling conditions, β = -0.10, SE = 0.21, p = 0.65, story information type, β = -0.06, SE 
= 0.20, p = 0.76, and age group, β = 0.07, SE = 0.20, p = 0.70; no interactions were 
significant (ps > .05).  
Although not statistically significant, younger and older children showed different 
response patterns between the occupation and trait story, similar to those shown for the 
Novel Activities Question. For the trait story, younger children (M = 0.60, SD = 0.49) 
were at chance for conceptual matches, t(52) = 1.53, p = 0.13, but older children (M = 
0.74, SD = 0.45) were more likely to make conceptual matches than expected by chance, 
t(52) = 3.86, p < .001. However, younger and older children did not differ significantly in 
their conceptual matching for the trait story, χ(1, N = 106) = 2.09, p = 0.15. For the 
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occupation story, younger children (M = 0.62, SD = 0.49) did not differ significantly 
from older children (M = 0.64, SD = 0.48) in conceptual matching, χ(1, N = 106) = 0.04, 
p = 0.84. Younger children’s conceptual matches did not differ from chance for the 
occupation story, t(52) = 1.82, p = 0.07, but older children were more likely to make 
conceptual matches than expected by chance, t(52) = 2.13, p = 0.04. 
For the trait story, 50.0% of children’s justifications were trait based, 24.5% were 
appearance based, 17.0% were irrelevant, and 8.5% suggested memory errors. Cohen’s 
kappa was .78. For the occupation story, 44.3% of children’s justifications were 
occupation based, 30.2% were appearance based, 20.8% were irrelevant, and 4.7% 
suggested memory errors. Cohen’s Kappa was .92.  
Comparing the novel activities question and the friendship question. 
Predictions about differences between the Novel Activities Question and the Friendship 
Question did not differ by story information type. Therefore, Total Novel Activity 
Matching and Total Friendship Matching scores were used. A one-way MANOVA was 
used to compare Total Novel Activity Matching and Total Friendship Matching across 
age groups. There was no significant difference in Total Novel Activity Matching and 
Total Friendship Matching between younger and older children, F(2, 103) = 1.10, p = 
.34, Wilk’s Λ = .98, partial η2 = .02. 
Supplementary analyses. Participant matching decisions were not hypothesized 
to differ based on participant gender (i.e., differences between boys’ matching vs. girls’ 
matching), as no gender differences were reported in studies that used a similar 
methodology (i.e., Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006; Heyman & Gelman, 2000). 
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Accordingly, participant gender was not included in the complete binary repeated 
measures logistic regression models for the Novel Activities Question and the Friendship 
Question. For supplementary analyses, a 2 (age group: 5- and 6-year-olds vs. 7- and 8-
year-olds) x 2 (labeling condition: labeled vs. unlabeled) x 2 (story information type: trait 
vs. occupation) x 2 (participant gender: boy vs. girl) binary repeated measures logistic 
regression analysis was completed for the Novel Activities Question and for the 
Friendship Question.  
No significant effects emerged for the Novel Activities Question, except for the 
story information type x age group interaction discussed previously in the main analyses, 
β = 0.65, SE = 0.30, p = .03. 
A story information type x participant gender interaction was found for the 
Friendship Question, β = 0.39, SE = 0.20, p = 0.05. For the trait story, boys (M = .60, SD 
= .50) and girls (M = .74, SD = .44) did not differ significantly in their conceptual 
matches, χ(1, N = 106) = 2.50, p = .11. Still, girls made more conceptual matches than 
expected by chance, t(53) = 3.40, p < .001, but boys’ matches were at chance, t(51) = 
1.40, p = .17. For the occupation story, boys (M = .67, SD = .47) and girls (M = .59, SD = 
.50) also did not differ significantly in their conceptual matches, χ(1, N = 106) = .74, p = 
.39. Contrary to the trait story, boys made more conceptual matches than expected by 
chance for the occupation story, t(51) = 2.64, p = .01, and girls performed at chance, t(53) 
= 1.37, p = .18. See Figure 2.  
A significant age group x participant gender interaction emerged for the 
Friendship Question, β = -0.72, SE = 0.23, p = .002. There was a main effect of age 
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group, β = 0.46, SE = 0.21, p = 0.03, but there was no significant difference between 
younger children (M = 1.21, SD = .77) and older children (M = 1.34, SD = .73), t(104) = -
.91, p = .37. Rather, boys’ performance drove the interaction: younger boys (M = 1.00, 
SD = .80) made significantly less conceptual matches than older boys (M = 1.50, SD = 
.65), t(50) = -2.48, p = .02.  Younger boys did not differ from chance, t(26) = 1.00, p = 
1.00, but older boys performed above chance, t(25) = 3.93, p = .001. Conversely, younger 
girls (M = 1.41, SD = .69) and older girls (M = 1.19, SD = .77) did not differ significantly 
in conceptual matches, t(52) = 1.10, p = .28. Conceptual matches by younger girls were 
above chance, t(26) = 3.05, p = .01, but matches by older girls were not, t(26) = 1.22, p = 
.23. See Figure 3. 
Secondary Measures 
Essentialism measure. Children received a score from 0 to 4 (0 = I really 
disagree, 1 = I disagree, 2 = I don’t agree or disagree, 3 = I agree, 4 = I really agree) for 
each question on the Essentialism Measure. Scores were combined across questions to 
create a score of children’s Total Gender Essentialism Endorsement, with a range from 0 
to 16. Pearson correlations between each question on the Essentialism Measure, Total 
Gender Essentialism Endorsement, Total Novel Activity Matching, Total Friendship 
Matching, and Age Group were conducted. There was a significant negative correlation 
between age group and the first question on the Essentialism Measure (“Being a boy or a 
girl is a very important part of what makes kids who they are.”), r = -.26, p = .007. There 
was also a significant positive correlation between age group and the fourth question on 
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the Essentialism Measure (“Kids are either boys or girls, there is nothing in between.”), r 
= .29, p = .003. Correlations were then computed separately for the labeled and unlabeled 
conditions, but none emerged as significant. See Table 6. 
Droodles task. Children’s answers were scored following guidelines from 
Lagattuta et al. (2010). Of particular interest were children’s responses to person-specific 
experiences (i.e., Distinct-Pasts task), but analyses were conducted for each task (i.e., 
Relevant-Past, Irrelevant-Past, Distinct-Pasts). Correlations between children’s complete 
scores from each Droodles Task, total performance across all Droodles Tasks, Total 
Novel Activity Matching, Total Friendship Matching, and Age Group were not 
significant. See Table 7.  
Exploratory Analyses 
All the following measures were included for exploratory purposes, as they have 
not been supplemented with the trio paradigm in previous research. These measures were 
expected to reveal more about children’s attitudes and beliefs about the characters. 
Target character activity inferences. Children received a score of 0 if they 
inferred the target preferred a boy stereotypical activity, a score of 1 if they inferred the 
target preferred a neutral activity or both girl and boy stereotypical activities, and a score 
of 2 if the they inferred the target preferred a girl stereotypical activity. Summed across 
all questions, scores ranged from 0 to 18. There was no significant difference between 
activity inferences in the occupation (M = 7.82, SD = 3.34) and the trait stories (M = 7.81, 
SD = 3.43), t(103) = -.04, p = .97. Scores were then combined across stories to create a 
Total Activity Inference score. Combined scores ranged from 0 to 36. No significant 
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correlations emerged between Total Activity Inference scores and the Novel Activities 
Question or the Friendship Question. With age group included, there was a significant 
negative correlation between age group and Total Activity Inferences, r = -.26, p = .01. 
To determine if the inclusion of explicit gender information shifted responses to this 
measure, labeling conditions were compared. No effects emerged significant when 
comparing Total Activity Inference scores across the labeled (M = 15.83, SD = 4.75) and 
unlabeled (M = 15.44, SD = 5.46) conditions, t(102) = -.38, p = .70.  
Character liking and affiliation. Liking and affiliation was measured with the 
following scale for each character: 0 = a little, 1 = in the middle, 2 = a lot. There was no 
significant difference for liking and affiliation scores between stories (ps > .05). Scores 
were summed to create a Total Liking and Total Affiliation score for each character, 
creating a range from 0 - 4. No significant correlations emerged between each grouping 
question and Total Liking or Total Affiliation. There was also no significant correlations 
with story information type, labeling condition, or age group (ps > .05). Given the 0 (a 
little) to 4 (a lot) range, children were neutral in their reported desire for affiliation with 
the target (M = 2.24, SD = 1.16) and liking for the target (M = 1.96, SD = 1.13). 
Younger children (M = 2.02, SD = 1.25) and older children (M = 1.91, SD = 1.01) 
did not differ significantly in their liking for the target, F(1, 104) = .27, p = .61. Younger 
children (M = 2.76, SD = 1.16) and older children (M = 2.43, SD = 1.19) also did not 
differ significantly in their liking for the stereotypical character, F(1, 104) = 1.99, p = .16. 
Additionally, younger children (M = 2.26, SD = 1.27) and older children (M = 2.21, SD = 
1.04) did not differ significantly in reported affiliation with the target F(1, 104) = .06, p = 
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.80. Younger children (M = 2.89, SD = 1.10) and older children (M = 2.57, SD = 1.19) 
also did not differ significantly in reported affiliation with the stereotypical character, 
F(1, 104) = 2.08, p = .15.  
Character trait attributions. For scoring, 0 = mean, 1 = not nice or mean, 2 = 
nice. Character attributions did not differ significantly between story information type (ps 
> .05). Scores were then summed across stories to create a Total Trait Attribution score 
for each character, creating a range from 0 – 4. Correlations between each character’s 
Total Trait Attribution score and the Novel Activities Question, along with the Friendship 
Question, were not significant. Correlations between Total Trait Attribution scores and 
age group were also not significant. Still, it is important to note that children were 
positive (M = 3.32, SD = 1.02) in their trait attributions for the target, given the 0 (mean) 
to 4 (nice) scale. 
Also, younger children (M = 2.27, SD = 1.11) and older children (M = 3.38, SD = 
.95) did not differ significantly in their trait attributions for the target, F(1, 103) = .29, p = 
.59. Relatedly, younger children (M = 3.34, SD = 1.07) and older children (M = 3.51, SD 
= .89) did not differ significantly in their trait attributions for the stereotypical character, 




The present study is one of the first to assess what type of information children 
use to reason about gender ambiguous individuals. Generally, older children used 
conceptual information to group the target (i.e., predict the gender ambiguous target’s 
novel activity preferences and friendships), while younger children did not show 
consistent reliance on conceptual or appearance information. The type of conceptual 
information (i.e., trait or occupation) provided within each story also changed children’s 
responses. For the trait story, older children used trait similarities to guide their grouping 
decisions for the target, but younger children were as likely to use trait or appearance 
information. For the occupation story, children mostly used occupation and appearance 
information to inform their grouping decisions for the target and this was evident across 
development. Children’s reasoning abilities and their lack of familiarity with gender 
ambiguity might explain why they exhibited distinct responses across age and story 
information type.  
 Only older children consistently made trait-based novel activity and friendship 
inferences about the target, suggesting improved trait reasoning with age. Prior research 
reveals that children exhibit improvements in trait reasoning across childhood. By 7 years 
of age, children use traits to describe others (e.g., Livesley & Bromley, 1973) and can 
successfully use traits in categorical and dimensional terms (Gonzalez, Zosuls, & Ruble, 
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2010). Perhaps the ability to describe a person with traits and consider traits 
dimensionally entails a sophisticated understanding of traits, such as greater knowledge 
about the behavioral implications of a trait. Consequently, traits might be regarded as a 
strong basis for making inferences about unfamiliar others (i.e., the target), at least 
compared to superficial, appearance-based cues that might not entail as much 
information. 
In addition to a complex understanding of trait information, older children’s 
ability to regard trait information over appearance information indicates a departure from 
superficial, perceptual-based reasoning. Older children value perceptual information 
when it is the only information provided within a task, but, unlike younger children, 
switch to other sources of information (e.g., behaviors) when those are provided in 
conjunction with perceptual information (e.g., Hoffner & Cantor, 1985). This would 
suggest that if only appearance information was used in the present study, older children 
might have made appearance-based grouping decisions. However, it is critical to note that 
older children’s tendency to overlook superficial cues (e.g., appearance) in the presence 
of more telling information (e.g., traits) was limited to the trait story.  
Younger children used perceptual information and trait information similarly to 
infer the target’s novel activity preferences and friendships, implying a consideration for 
perceptual information that is not always captured through investigations with characters 
of traditional appearance. In contexts outside of perceptual gender ambiguity, younger 
children view traits as stable and predictive, although they are biased in some ways, such 
as by often making positive trait attributions (Boseovski, 2010; Heyman & Gelman, 
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2000; Liu et al., 2007). Perceptual gender ambiguity might have triggered a focus on 
perceptual information that competed with the value often placed on relevant trait 
information. Some prior research is consistent with the idea that younger children engage 
in appearance-based reasoning (e.g., Hoffner & Cantor, 1985; Rholes & Ruble, 1984). 
For example, younger children are influenced by the strength of appearance information 
that is simultaneously provided with trait information (Gonzalez et al., 2010) and 
sometimes value appearance over trait-based behavioral information to make predictions 
about others (e.g., Hoffner & Cantor, 1985). Past findings suggest that appearance-based 
reasoning results from children’s cognitive abilities. A similar explanation applies to 
younger children’s inconsistent friendship and novel activity inferences about the target. 
Specifically, younger children engage in preoperational thinking, which then 
results in a weakened ability to conceptualize properties about a person as enduring 
(Rholes & Ruble, 1984). This subsequently elicits a failure to see those properties as 
causal and therefore as proper sources of inference. However, it is important to integrate 
these suggestions with research that shows sophisticated trait reasoning in younger 
children (e.g. Heyman & Gelman, 2000). Younger children’s inconsistent predictions 
about the target might entail that they failed to characterize traits as more persistent and 
telling of the target than appearance information. In other words, younger children saw 
appearance and trait information as stable and predictive in the context of perceptual 
gender ambiguity. As further evidence of this, 5-year-olds use trait and gender categories 
comparably when making predictions about another person (Diesendruck & haLevi, 
2006). Consequently, diminished reliance on trait information might extend to contexts in 
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which general gender information (e.g., gender category) explicitly competes with trait 
information as a source of making decisions about another person.  
By contrast, nuanced patterns emerged for the occupation story that require 
separate explanations for the Novel Activities Question and Friendship Question. First, 
the Novel Activities Question and Friendship Question were not significantly different, 
demonstrating that gender ambiguity generally diminished the presence of gender in-
group biases typically found in children’s friendship decisions (e.g., Maccoby, 1990; 
Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987). However, there were distinct trends for each question within 
the occupation story: across age groups, children used both occupation and appearance 
information to inform their novel activity predictions for the target, but only older 
children used occupation information consistently to guide their friendship predictions. 
Older children’s friendship predictions hint at their increasingly flexible views of gender 
in middle childhood (e.g., Martin, 1989). Older children did not regard gender as a sole 
indicator of friendship (e.g., girls should only be friends with other girls), which led them 
to predict that the target could be friends with the stereotypical character. Thus, flexible 
gender attitudes in middle childhood, as described by previous studies (e.g., Martin, 
1989), extend to perceptual gender ambiguity. However, this flexibility was limited to the 
Friendship Question. Children’s limited understanding of occupations might provide 
insight into their inconsistent decisions about the target for the Novel Activities Question 
across development. 
Generally, children have some knowledge about occupations. For example, they 
can associate occupations to specific gender categories (e.g., Weisgram, Bigler, & Liben, 
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2010). Even more broadly, they associate activities to specific gender groups (see Liben 
& Bigler, 2002 for review). However, associations do not entail that children have 
sufficient knowledge that would allow for occupation information to inform predictions 
about another person consistently. Relatedly, 5-year-olds exhibit a general understanding 
of disciplines but fail to understand the complexities and relations underlying to those 
disciplines (Danovitch & Keil, 2004). By extension, children might understand what an 
occupation generally entails, but not other characteristics of an occupation, such as the 
kind of commitment, education, or other more complex and non-obvious characteristics 
often implied for adults.  
For example, when children were told that the target wanted to be an artist, 
perhaps they perceived the target as someone who makes art and is knowledgeable about 
art. General knowledge about occupations might have been enough to suggest similar 
activities and behaviors (e.g., an artist paints) between two people with shared occupation 
preferences. Children’s friendships are often based on play patterns (Maccoby, 1990), 
indicating that they likely use activities to inform friendship predictions. The activities 
associated with occupations could have therefore led older children to use occupations to 
inform their friendship predictions for the target. It could have also led younger children 
to use occupation information more than trait information for the Friendship Question.  
A simple understanding of occupations, coupled with a lack of familiarity with 
novel activities, might have led to the inconsistent use of appearance and occupation 
information to inform novel activity predictions across age. To continue the artist 
example above, children might have failed to acknowledge non-obvious features, such as 
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the amount of practice needed to become an artist, which routes lead to sufficient 
knowledge about art, or other interests and characteristics that might be common among 
artists. Consequently, occupation information was not indicative of much information for 
children, especially unfamiliar novel activity information. In fact, children engage in 
property-based reasoning over appearance-based reasoning when given familiar 
properties over unfamiliar properties (Gelman et al., 1986), entailing the role of 
knowledge about a property (e.g., occupations) in the subsequent and successful use of 
property information. Nevertheless, children recalled the occupations presented in the 
stories, suggesting that limited knowledge about occupations did not hinder their 
understanding of the story, but only the application of that information to guide their 
novel activity predictions for the target.  
  A simple understanding of occupations cannot fully explain the patterns exhibited 
in children’s novel activity predictions. When familiar preferences (i.e., colors) were 
compared to appearance information, preschoolers used preferences as much as they used 
appearance to guide their novel activity predictions about another person (Heyman & 
Gelman, 2000, Experiment 3). This suggests that children might not consider preferences 
when asked to make inferences about others. Still, color preferences do not necessarily 
equate to occupation preferences, given the breadth of information occupations entail. 
Regardless, perhaps other factors, such as perceptual gender ambiguity, also contributed 
to children’s inconsistent novel activity predictions for the occupation story.  
In traditionally gendered contexts, children demonstrate abundant knowledge 
about gender (e.g., Martin et al., 2002) and show consistent patterns in their use of (or 
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lack thereof) activity preferences to inform their decisions about others (e.g., Martin, 
1989). Older children value activity preferences over gender category, while younger 
children do the opposite (Martin, 1989). Thus, there is at least consistency in children’s 
response patterns (Martin, 1989), which was missing when children were asked to infer 
novel activity preferences for the target. In contrast to contexts regarding known 
activities and the traditional gender categories, participants could not use their existing 
gender knowledge and experience to supplement their decisions about the target. Akin to 
the perceptual focus that younger kids exhibited in the trait story, a focus by older and 
younger children on untraditional and unfamiliar perceptual gender ambiguity during the 
occupation story might have brought forth inconsistent novel activity predictions.  
 A focus on the target’s perceptual information might also explain why 
overinterpretive theory of mind did not relate to children’s novel activity and friendship 
decisions about the target across development. If children focused on appearance 
information, rather than focusing on the target’s individuating factors (an overinterpretive 
theory of mind; Lagattuta et al., 2010), an overinterpretive theory of mind should not be 
associated with predictions made about the target. 
Also, reported liking, desire for affiliation, and trait attributions made toward the 
target did not correlate with children’s friendship and novel activity predictions, 
regardless of age. This suggests that children’s own attitudes about the target did not 
systematically determine whether predictions about the target were primarily appearance 
or conceptually based. Younger and older children reported similar liking and desire for 
affiliation with the target, suggesting that age was not related to changes in reported 
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attitudes toward the target. Children also made positive trait attributions toward the 
target, providing further evidence for the positivity bias reported in children through 
middle childhood (Boseovski, 2010). The positivity bias was reflected similarly in both 
older and younger children’s trait attributions for the target. Since children were not 
overwhelmingly negative, these results contrast previous findings that reveal negative 
attitudes across childhood toward individuals who depart from gender stereotypical 
expectations (Blakemore, 2003). This provides further evidence that perceptual gender 
ambiguity elicited responses that do not parallel trends found in more traditionally 
gendered contexts. 
What About Labeling? 
Children’s lack of familiarity with perceptual gender ambiguity can also indicate 
why explicit gender ambiguous labels did not impact children’s novel activity or 
friendship predictions about the target across age. In other words, the target’s labeled 
gender ambiguity cannot change children’s grouping decisions about the target if gender 
ambiguity is unfamiliar. The lack of labeling effect was expected for older children, but 
not due to a lack of familiarity with gender ambiguity. Rather, older children show 
flexibility in their beliefs about gender (e.g., Serbin & Sprafkin, 1986). Consequently, 
they were expected to go beyond labels and use other information (i.e., trait, occupation) 
to guide their inferences about the target. However, with increasing age, children were 
more likely to support the binary notion that people can only be boys or girls on the 
Essentialism Measure. This implies that older children’s flexibility with gender beliefs 
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might be limited to attitudes and sources valued for prediction, rather than beliefs that 
individuals might exist outside the gender binary.  
In contrast, younger children were expected to make fewer conceptual matches 
when provided with gender ambiguity labels, given their in-group biases for objects and 
people that are given a gender label (e.g., Bradbard et al., 1986; Martin et al., 1995). To 
further support this, with decreasing age, children judged gender as more important to 
what makes people who they are on the Essentialism Measure, further exhibiting their 
attention to gender category labels. The unfamiliarity of gender ambiguity labels in the 
present study might have made labels irrelevant when making inferences about the target, 
suggesting that younger children lacked essentialist beliefs that all individuals with a 
gender ambiguous label hold intrinsic similarities outside of appearance. In other words, 
younger children’s gender essentialist beliefs about the traditional gender categories (e.g., 
Rhodes & Gelman, 2009) did not extend to gender ambiguous people. Additionally, 
children overlook labels when considered arbitrary and irrelevant to the task (Heyman & 
Gelman, 2000, Experiment 2). It is possible that children’s predictions for the target 
would exhibit a labeling effect in more gendered contexts. For example, children could 
be asked whether the target engages in activities that are stereotypically associated with 
girls or boys. The target character activity inferences measure did this, yet children’s 
responses did not shift in the presence of a gender ambiguity label. Nevertheless, gender 





Gender Differences for Friendship Predictions 
Gender differences were exhibited in children’s friendship predictions for the 
target, which changed between story information type and exhibit general differences in 
what boys and girls consider a meaningful basis for friendship. These analyses were 
supplementary, as no gender differences were reported in studies using a similar 
paradigm (e.g., Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006) and therefore participant gender was not 
hypothesized to differentially impact what information children used to make inferences 
about the target. Boys used occupation information to guide their decisions about the 
target’s friendships, but used trait and appearance information inconsistently for the same 
question, suggesting that boys consider activities as more indicative of friendship than 
trait information. For example, since artists engage in the same activities (e.g., painting, 
drawing), artists might be more likely to be friends than two people with similar 
appearance features or traits. Consistent with this idea, friendships between boys are 
described as primarily activity-based (Maccoby, 1990). By contrast, girls used trait 
information to guide their friendship decisions for the target, but used appearance and 
occupation information comparably. Past findings describe friendships between girls with 
intimate characteristics (Maccoby, 1990). Perhaps girls perceived trait information as 
more intimate to the target than appearance or occupation preferences. Still, it is 
important to note that these gender differences were not uniform across development.  
Children’s beliefs about friendship competed with age-related improvements in 
flexibility regarding gender attitudes and biases. Compared to older boys, younger boys 
were less likely to use conceptual information to inform how they grouped the target for 
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the Friendship Question, which indicates categorical based reasoning. Regardless of trait 
or occupation information, younger boys might have generally believed that the target 
should not be friends with the gender stereotypical character, as the gender stereotypical 
character should only be friends with people of the same gender category. This follows 
past research with the traditional gender categories: younger children use gender labels 
and categories to make inferences about friendship (e.g., Martin & Little, 1990; Shutts et 
al., 2013), but older children exhibit flexibility that goes beyond categorical based 
thinking in their predictions about others (e.g., Martin, 1989).  
Conversely, older girls made fewer conceptual matches than younger girls, 
suggesting that flexible gender beliefs cannot fully account for age differences in 
children’s friendship predictions for the target. Given that girls view friendship with 
greater intimacy than boys (Maccoby, 1990), it follows that conceptual (whether trait or 
occupation) information would generally be prioritized over appearance information. At 
the same time, friendship groups tend to become more homogenous as children grow 
older and some research suggests that this is seen more in girls than in boys (Maccoby, 
1990; Powlishta, 1995; Yee & Brown, 1994). Younger girls might have relied on the 
intimate information provided by conceptual information, at least compared to 
appearance information, but older girls might have also relied on their in-group biases 
that indicate friendship groups should be homogeneous and therefore the target should be 
friends with other gender ambiguous people and/or not a traditional gendered character. 
In sum, children’s inferences about the target’s friendships suggest underlying gender 
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differences in views of friendship, supplemented by age-related changes in flexibility 
with gender beliefs.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Gender categorization is an automatic process by 4 years of age (Weisman, 
Johnson, & Shutts, 2015), rendering it difficult to accept perceptual gender ambiguity. 
This automaticity is especially relevant to younger children, as they often overlook 
appearance features and place great value on categorical information (e.g., Gelman et al., 
1986). To prevent automatic gender categorization, future studies must consider 
removing all forms of gender cues from stimuli. For example, silhouettes can be used that 
lack gender-related information and require experimenters to explicitly label gender 
categories or gender ambiguity. If these changes replicate the present findings, it would 
imply that the context of gender ambiguity changes previously established patterns 
pertinent to information that children use to make inferences about other people.   
Additionally, children’s justifications for their grouping decisions were primarily 
irrelevant for the Novel Activities Question, suggesting an effect of verbal limitations 
compounded with a lack of familiarity with novel activities. Children might have known 
to make an appearance or conceptually based prediction, but were unable to explain their 
decision verbally in an unfamiliar context (i.e., novel activities). By contrast, the 
Friendship Question elicited a more familiar context, as evidenced by children’s 
increased tendency to make appearance or conceptually based justifications. Therefore, 
children successfully applied their prior knowledge that similarities (e.g., “both 
characters want to be cooks”) can serve as a foundation for friendship. By contrast, novel 
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activities were unfamiliar and children might not have known to rely on similarities to 
inform their predictions for the Novel Activities Question.  
To dampen the effects of verbal limitations and familiarity with novel activities, 
future studies should replace the open-ended justification question with a forced-choice 
justification question. This limits responses to appearance or conceptual reasoning. If this 
leads children’s justifications to more closely follow their grouping decisions, 
justifications could provide further evidence for what information children use to make 
predictions about gender ambiguous individuals. 
It is also critical to include additional secondary measures to capture parallel 
developmental processes that explain children’s inferences about the target. If the 
perceptual novelty of the target heavily interferes with and impacts children’s inferences 
about the target, better cognitive abilities, such as flexibility and inhibitory control, might 
elicit more conceptual matches over appearance matches. These abilities might be 
associated with less gender category-based thinking and gender biases, given that such 
skills could indicate the ability to overcome strong and predominant notions about gender 
(e.g., everyone is either a boy or a girl; girls should be friends with other girls). Those 
with better flexibility and inhibitory control might be more likely to group the target and 
gender stereotypical character together. Gender biases might be more difficult to 
overcome for those with less flexibility and inhibitory control, such that the target is not 
be grouped with people of the traditional gender categories due to the target’s departure 
from gender category expectations.  
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Lastly, the disparate responses between the trait and occupation stories also 
warrant further investigation. This was not limited to the main task, as results from the 
baseline condition indicated more frequent appearance matches for the occupation story 
than for the trait story. In general, occupations and other preferences might not be 
regarded as better sources of prediction than trait information. Therefore, it is important 
to question whether occupations would overpower appearance and gender category 
information with only members of the traditional gender categories. Including occupation 
information within a trio of individuals belonging to the traditional gender categories 
(e.g., the target and member of the opposite gender category share occupation 
preferences, but the target and the remaining character share appearance and gender 
category) can indicate the value children place on occupation and general preference 
information. If occupations and preferences still do not impact children’s responses, then 
perhaps the trio paradigm cannot capture the activity-based predictions children display 
through other paradigms in the gender literature.  
Conclusion 
 In sum, only older children used trait information over appearance information to 
make inferences about perceptually gender ambiguous people. Across age groups, 
children mostly used occupation information and appearance information similarly to 
guide their predictions about perceptually gender ambiguous individuals. Given that past 
findings (e.g., Gelman et al., 1986) which demonstrate the inductive power of gender do 
not fully account for these effects, it is necessary to expand traditional frameworks with 
consideration for perceptual gender ambiguity. Otherwise, developmental theories and 
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knowledge will continue to lack full consideration for individuals that exist in the real 
world. Given the experiences gender ambiguous individuals might endure in their lives 
due to their lack of adherence to the traditional gender categories, the literature can 
provide empirically based knowledge that promotes the idea of gender ambiguity in 
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Descriptive Statistics and Tests Against Chance for Matching in Baseline 




Novel Activities Friendship 
M (SD) Tests against chance M 
(SD) 
Tests against chance 
5-6 0.84 
(0.37) 
t(24) = 4.54, p < .001 0.80 
(0.41) 
t(24) = 3.67, p = .001 
7-8 0.96 
(0.20) 
t(23) = 11.00, p < .001 0.92 
(0.28) 
t(23) = 7.23, p < .001 
Note. Dependent variable scores: 0 = target matched with stereotypical character, 1= 






Frequency of Responses for Ambiguity Check Questions for the Unlabeled Condition 
  Trait    Occupation 
Question Boy Girl Not Sure   Boy Girl Not Sure 
1 52.8% 15.1% 32.1%  69.8% 11.3% 18.9% 
2 60.4% 15.1% 24.5%  67.9% 9.4% 22.6% 
3 32.1% 3.8% 64.2%  30.2% 5.7% 64.2% 
Note. Question 1: Do you think this person [point to target] is a boy, a girl, or you’re not 
sure?” Question 2: “Do you think this person [point to target] looks like a boy, a girl, or 
you’re not sure?” Question 3: “Is this person friends with boys, girls, or both?” Note that 





Frequency of Responses for Ambiguity Check Questions for the Labeled Condition 
 Trait  Occupation 
Question Boy Girl Not Sure  Boy Girl Not Sure 
1 24.5% 9.6% 64.2%  34.0% 7.5% 56.6% 
2 26.4% 11.3% 60.4%  28.3% 9.4% 60.4% 
3 15.1% 7.5% 75.0%  17.0% 3.8% 77.4% 
Note. Question 1: Do you think this person [point to target] is a boy, a girl, or you’re not 
sure?” Question 2: “Do you think this person [point to target] looks like a boy, a girl, or 
you’re not sure?” Question 3: “Is this person friends with boys, girls, or both?” Note that 





Means, Standard Deviations, and Tests Against Chance for Matching in the 

































5-6 27 0.48 
(0.51) 
 27 0.59 
(0.50) 
 27 0.56 
(0.51) 
 27 0.59 
(0.50) 
7-8 26 0.65 
(0.49) 
 26 0.73 
(0.45)** 
 26 0.54 
(0.51) 
 26 0.58 
(0.50) 
 Note. ** indicates significance against chance p <  .01. Dependent variable scores: 0 = 
target matched with ambiguous character (shared appearance information), 1 = target 





Means, Standard Deviations, and Tests Against Chance for Matching in the Unlabeled 


































5-6 26 0.46 
(0.51) 
 26 0.62 
(0.50) 
 26 0.69 
(0.47)* 
 26 0.65 
(0.49) 
7-8 27 0.74 
(0.45)** 
 27 0.74 
(0.45)** 
 27 0.63 
(0.49) 
 27 0.70 
(0.47)* 
 Note. *indicates significance against chance at p < .05, ** indicates significance against 
chance p <  .01. Dependent variable scores: 0 = target matched with ambiguous character 






Correlations Between Matching Variables and Essentialism Measure 
Variable Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Total  
Labeled, Age Group -0.29 -0.01 -0.16  0.26 -0.07 
Labeled, NA -0.04  0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 
Labeled, Friendship   0.15  0.12 -0.16 -0.10 -0.02 
Unlabeled, Age 
Group 
-0.25  0.06 -0.19  0.32 -0.01 
Unlabeled, NA -0.15 -0.11  0.05  0.18 -0.01 
Unlabeled, 
Friendship 
 0.00 -0.01 -0.16 -0.06 -0.10 
Age Group -0.26** -0.01 -0.17  0.29** -0.04 
NA  -0.11 -0.06  0.01  0.07 -0.03 
Friendship  -0.07 -0.04 -0.17 -0.08 -0.06 





Table 7  
Correlations Between Matching Variables and Droodles Task 
Variable Irrelevant-Past Relevant-Past Distinct-Pasts Total 
Age Group  0.05  0.21  0.09  0.17 
Total NA  0.03  0.06 -0.10 -0.00 
Total Friendship  -0.14 -0.07 -0.01 -0.12 
Note. *indicates significance at p < .05. NA = Novel Activities Question, Friendship = 







Figure 1. Story Information Type x Age Group Interaction. Mean number of conceptual 
matches for the Novel Activities Question by Story Information Type and Age Group. 
Participants received a score of 0 for appearance matches and a score of 1 for conceptual 
matches on the Novel Activities Question. Scores ranged from 0 – 1. Error bars indicate 
standard errors. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates significance against 























Younger (5- and 6-year-
olds)






Figure 2. Story Information Type x Participant Gender Interaction. Mean number of 
conceptual matches for the Friendship Question by Story Information Type and 
Participant Gender. Participants received a score of 0 for appearance matches and a score 
of 1 for conceptual matches on the Friendship Question. Scores ranged from 0 – 1. Error 
bars indicate standard errors. ** indicates significance against chance, p < .01 and *** 






























Figure 3. Participant Gender x Age Group Interaction. Mean number of conceptual 
matches for the Friendship Question by Participant Gender and Age Group. Participants 
received a score of 0 for appearance matches and a score of 1 for conceptual matches on 
the Friendship Question. Scores ranged from 0 – 2, as matches were combined across 
story information type. Error bars indicate standard errors. * indicates p < .05. and ** 
indicates significance against chance, p < .01 and *** indicates significance against 

























Younger (5- and 6-year-olds)






STIMULI AND VIGNETTES 
 
Sample set, first trio (Labeled, Trait, Participant Gender - Boy): Gender stereotypical 
character - top left, perceptually gender ambiguous character – top right, target – center. 
 
 
Sample set, second trio (Labeled, Occupation, Participant Gender - Boy): Perceptually 





Labeled Girl, Occupation: “Here are three people. This person [point to woman] is a 
girl. She looks like a girl. She [continue pointing] wants to be a cook. She [likes to play 
jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at villing/kranoot]. We’re not sure about this person [point 
to gender ambiguous character]. This person doesn’t look like a boy or a girl. This 
person [continue pointing] wants to be an artist. This person [likes to play jimjam/tibbits 
OR spend time at villing/kranoot]. We’re not sure about this person [point to target] 
either. This person doesn’t look like a boy or a girl, like this person [point to gender 
ambiguous character]. Also, this person [continue pointing to target] wants to be a cook, 
like her [point to woman].” 
 
Labeled Boy, Occupation: “Here are three people. This person [point to man] is a boy. 
He looks like a boy. He wants [continue pointing] to be a cook. He [likes to play 
jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at villing/kranoot]. We’re not sure about this person [point 
to gender ambiguous character]. This person doesn’t look like a boy or a girl. This 
person [continue pointing] wants to be an artist. This person [likes to play jimjam/tibbits 
OR spend time at villing/kranoot]. We’re not sure about this person [point to target] 
either. This person doesn’t look like a boy or a girl, like this person [point to gender 
ambiguous character]. Also, this person [continue pointing to target] wants to be a cook, 
like him [point to man].”  
 
Unlabeled Girls/Boys, Occupation: “Here are three people. This person [point to man 
or woman] is short. This person wears small clothes. This person [continue pointing] 
wants to be a cook. This person [likes to play jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at 
villing/kranoot].  We’re not sure if this person [point to gender ambiguous character] is 
tall or short. We’re not sure if they wear big or small clothes. This person [continue 
pointing] wants to be an artist. This person [likes to play jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at 
villing/kranoot]. We’re not sure if this person [point to target] is tall or short either. 
We’re not sure if they wear big or small clothes, like this person [point to gender 
ambiguous character]. This person [continue pointing to target] wants to be a cook, like 
this person [point to man or woman].” 
 
Labeled Girls, Trait: “Here are three people. This person [point to woman] is a girl. She 
looks like a girl. She is shy. She [likes to play jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at 
villing/kranoot]. We’re not sure about this person [point to gender ambiguous character]. 
This person doesn’t look like a boy or a girl. This person [continue pointing] is creative. 
This person [likes to play jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at villing/kranoot]. We’re not 
sure about this person [point to target] either. This person doesn’t look like a boy or a 
girl, like this person [point to gender ambiguous character]. Also, this person [continue 
pointing to target] is shy, like her [point to woman].” 
 
Labeled Boys, Trait: “Here are three people. This person [point to man] is a boy. He 
looks like a boy. He is shy. He [likes to play jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at 
villing/kranoot]. We’re not sure about this person [point to gender ambiguous character]. 
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This person doesn’t look like a boy or a girl. This person [continue pointing] is creative. 
This person [likes to play jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at villing/kranoot]. We’re not 
sure about this person [point to target] either. This person doesn’t look like a boy or a 
girl, like this person [point to gender ambiguous character]. Also, this person [continue 
pointing to target] is shy, like him [point to man].”  
 
Unlabeled Girls/Boys, Trait: “Here are three people. This person [point to woman] is 
short. This person wears small clothes. This person is shy. This person [likes to play 
jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at villing/kranoot]. We’re not sure if this person [point to 
gender ambiguous character] is tall or short. We’re not sure they wear big or small 
clothes. This person [continue pointing] is creative. This person [likes to play 
jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at villing/kranoot]. We’re not sure if this person [point to 
target] is tall or short either. We’re not sure if they wear big or small clothes, like this 
person.  This person [continue pointing to target] is shy, like this person [point to 
woman].” 
 
Baseline, Trait: “Here are three people. This person [point to man or woman] is short. 
This person wears small clothes. This person [continue pointing] is creative. This person 
[likes to play jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at villing/kranoot]. We’re not sure if this 
person [point to gender ambiguous person] is tall or short. We’re not sure if they wear 
big or small clothes. This person [continue pointing] is shy. This person [likes to play 
jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at villing/kranoot]. We’re not sure if this person [point to 
target] is tall or short either. We’re not sure if they wear big or small clothes, like this 
person [point to gender ambiguous character].  This person [continue pointing to target] 
is shy, like this person [point to gender ambiguous character].” 
 
Baseline, Occupation: “Here are three people. This person [point to man or woman] is 
short. This person wears small clothes. This person [continue pointing] wants to be an 
artist. This person [likes to play jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at villing/kranoot].  We’re 
not sure if this person [point to gender ambiguous person] is tall or short. We’re not sure 
if they wear big or small clothes. This person [continue pointing] wants to be a cook. 
This person [likes to play jimjam/tibbits OR spend time at villing/kranoot]. We’re not 
sure if this person [point to target] is tall or short either. We’re not sure if they wear big 
or small clothes, like this person.  This person [continue pointing to target] wants to be a 







Repeat for each character in triad. Randomize order that characters are asked about 
(e.g., 1. target, 2. stereotypical character, 3. gender ambiguous character). Randomize 
gender presentation (labeled condition)/height information (unlabeled condition) for 
questions 1 and 2 for each character.  If participant answers a question incorrectly, re-
state information for character. Maximum 3 repeats of information for each question. 
Exclude participant if more repetitions are needed. Record all answers on scoresheet, 
including number of repetitions (if necessary). 
 
Labeled/Occupation, boys & girls:  
1) “Did I say this person is a boy, girl, or we’re not sure?” 
2) “Did I say this person looks like a boy, girl, or we’re not sure?” 
3) “Did I say this person wants to be a cook or an artist?” 
4) Ask for all characters EXCEPT for target: “Did I say this person likes to [play tibbits 
or jimjam OR spend time at villing/kranoot]?”  
 
Unlabeled/Occupation, boys & girls: 
1) “Did I say this person is short, tall, or we’re not sure?” 
2) “Did I say this person wears small clothes, big clothes, or we’re not sure?” 
3) “Did I say this person wants to be a cook or an artist?” 
4) Ask for all characters EXCEPT for target: “Did I say this person likes to [play tibbits 
or jimjam OR spend time at villing/kranoot]?”  
 
Labeled/Trait, boys & girls: 
1) “Did I say this person is a boy, girl, or we’re not sure?” 
2) “Did I say this person looks like a boy, girl, or we’re not sure?” 
3) “Did I say this person is shy or creative?” 
4) Ask for all characters EXCEPT for target: “Did I say this person likes to [play tibbits 
or jimjam OR spend time at villing/kranoot]?”  
 
Unlabeled/Trait, boys & girls: 
1) “Did I say this person is short, tall, or we’re not sure?” 
2) “Did I say this person wears small clothes, big clothes, or we’re not sure?” 
3) “Did I say this person is shy or creative?” 
4) Ask for all characters EXCEPT for target: “Did I say this person likes to [play tibbits 
or jimjam OR spend time at villing/kranoot]?”  
 
Baseline, occupation: 
1) “Did I say this person is short, tall, or we’re not sure?” 
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2) “Did I say this person wears small clothes, big clothes, or we’re not sure?” 
3) “Did I say this person wants to be a cook or an artist?” 
4) Ask for all characters EXCEPT for target: “Did I say this person likes to [play tibbits 
or jimjam OR spend time at villing/kranoot]?”  
 
Baseline, trait: 
1) “Did I say this person is short, tall, or we’re not sure?” 
2) “Did I say this person wears small clothes, big clothes, or we’re not sure?” 
3) “Did I say this person is shy or creative?” 
4) Ask for all characters EXCEPT for target: “Did I say this person likes to [play tibbits 






Novel Activities Question: 
Only administer for target. Randomize order of character information presented within 
the question (e.g., 1. ambiguous character information, 2. stereotypical character 
information). Record answers on scoresheet. 
a) Trait story: “Does this person like to [play TIBBITS / JIMJAM OR spend time 
at VILLING / KRANOOT] like this person who is SHY / CREATIVE or does 
this person like to [play TIBBITS / JIMJAM OR spend time at VILLING / 
KRANOOT] like this person who is SHY / CREATIVE?” 
b) Occupation story: “Does this person like to [play TIBBITS / JIMJAM OR spend 
time at VILLING / KRANOOT] like this person who wants to be a COOK / 
ARTIST or does this person like to [play TIBBITS / JIMJAM OR spend time at 
VILLING / KRANOOT] like this person who wants to be a COOK / 
ARTIST?” 
Friendship Question: 
Only administer for target. Record answers on scoresheet. 
a) “Who should this person [point to target] be friends with? Why?” 
Target character activity inferences: 
Only administer for the target. Record answers on scoresheet. 
1) Does this person like to play with dolls*, toy trucks, or both? 
2) Does this person like movies about princesses*, soldiers, or both? 
3) Does this person know a lot about ballet*, football, or both? 
4) Does this person like to build with tools, bake cookies*, or both? 
5) Does this person like to sew*, go to the beach, or both? 
6) Does this person like to play video games, go to the movies, or both? 
7) Does this person want to become an auto mechanic, a teacher*, or both? 
8) Does this person want to become a firefighter, a nurse*, or both? 
9) Does this person want to become an engineer, a baker, or both? 
10) Does this person want to become a secretary*, a writer, or both? 
*=stereotypical for girls; bold = gender neutral; all others = stereotypical for boy 
Character liking, affiliation, and trait attribution  
Administer for each character. Randomize order that each question is presented. 
Answer recorded on scoresheet. 
a) Liking: “How much do you like this person [point to target] –a lot, a little, or in the 
middle?” 
b) Affiliation: “How much would you like to be friends with this person [point to target] 
– a lot, a little, or in the middle?” 
























1) “For this next question, we’re going to use these circles. This one over here [point to 
largest circle – on the left] is really big and means “I really agree” This one over here is 
just big [point to second largest circle] and means “I agree” and this one in the middle 
[point to middle circle] is kind of big and means “I don’t agree/disagree” This next one is 
not really big [point to second smallest circle] and means “I disagree” and this one all the 
way over here [point to smallest circle – on the right] is not big at all – it’s tiny – and it 
means “I really disagree.” 
2) “Let’s do some practice questions. What’s something you like to do a whole lot?...So 
where would you point to show how much you agree if I said “You like ______.” And 
what’s something you do not like at all?...So where would you point to show how much 
you agree if I said “You like _____.” And what’s something you sort of like, you’re in the 
middle about it?...So where would you point to show how much you agree if I said “You 
like _____.” Okay, now we can ask some new questions.” 
 
Essentialism questions: 
1) “Being a boy or girl is a very important part of what makes kids who they are." 
2) “Boys have many things in common with boys and girls have many things in common 
with girls.” 
3) “Knowing if a kid is a girl or a boy tells you a lot about the kid." 




DROODLES TASK (FROM LAGATTUTA ET AL., 2010) 
  
Irrelevant-Past Trial: Distinguishing part of drawing is visible. All characters 
(including naïve observer) are knowledgeable about drawing content, regardless of 




Relevant-Past Trial: Only ambiguous portion of drawing is visible. Only the character 
that saw the boat prior to the placement of the occluder is knowledgeable about the 
content of the drawing. Naïve character does not know the content of the drawing. 
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Distinct-Past Trial: Only ambiguous portion of drawing is visible. Each character saw a 
different picture (i.e., only pig or only boot). Only the character that saw the pig prior to 
the placement of the occluder is knowledgeable about the content of the drawing. Naïve 
character does not know the content of the drawing. 
 
